switch to AES-GCM as symmetric cipher

fixes #200
This commit is contained in:
Lucas Clemente
2016-07-05 12:13:36 +02:00
parent 1fc83757a0
commit 705da8fd00
9 changed files with 312 additions and 87 deletions

58
crypto/aesgcm_aead.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
package crypto
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"errors"
"github.com/lucas-clemente/aes12"
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/protocol"
)
type aeadAESGCM struct {
otherIV []byte
myIV []byte
encrypter cipher.AEAD
decrypter cipher.AEAD
}
// NewAEADAESGCM creates a AEAD using AES-GCM with 12 bytes tag size
//
// AES-GCM support is a bit hacky, since the go stdlib does not support 12 byte
// tag size, and couples the cipher and aes packages closely.
// See https://github.com/lucas-clemente/aes12.
func NewAEADAESGCM(otherKey []byte, myKey []byte, otherIV []byte, myIV []byte) (AEAD, error) {
if len(myKey) != 16 || len(otherKey) != 16 || len(myIV) != 4 || len(otherIV) != 4 {
return nil, errors.New("AES-GCM: expected 16-byte keys and 4-byte IVs")
}
encrypterCipher, err := aes12.NewCipher(myKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
encrypter, err := aes12.NewGCM(encrypterCipher)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
decrypterCipher, err := aes12.NewCipher(otherKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
decrypter, err := aes12.NewGCM(decrypterCipher)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &aeadAESGCM{
otherIV: otherIV,
myIV: myIV,
encrypter: encrypter,
decrypter: decrypter,
}, nil
}
func (aead *aeadAESGCM) Open(packetNumber protocol.PacketNumber, associatedData []byte, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return aead.decrypter.Open(nil, makeNonce(aead.otherIV, packetNumber), ciphertext, associatedData)
}
func (aead *aeadAESGCM) Seal(packetNumber protocol.PacketNumber, associatedData []byte, plaintext []byte) []byte {
return aead.encrypter.Seal(nil, makeNonce(aead.myIV, packetNumber), plaintext, associatedData)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
package crypto
import (
"crypto/rand"
. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo"
. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
)
var _ = Describe("AES-GCM", func() {
var (
alice, bob AEAD
keyAlice, keyBob, ivAlice, ivBob []byte
)
BeforeEach(func() {
keyAlice = make([]byte, 16)
keyBob = make([]byte, 16)
ivAlice = make([]byte, 4)
ivBob = make([]byte, 4)
rand.Reader.Read(keyAlice)
rand.Reader.Read(keyBob)
rand.Reader.Read(ivAlice)
rand.Reader.Read(ivBob)
var err error
alice, err = NewAEADAESGCM(keyBob, keyAlice, ivBob, ivAlice)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
bob, err = NewAEADAESGCM(keyAlice, keyBob, ivAlice, ivBob)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
})
It("seals and opens", func() {
b := alice.Seal(42, []byte("aad"), []byte("foobar"))
text, err := bob.Open(42, []byte("aad"), b)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(text).To(Equal([]byte("foobar")))
})
It("seals and opens reverse", func() {
b := bob.Seal(42, []byte("aad"), []byte("foobar"))
text, err := alice.Open(42, []byte("aad"), b)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(text).To(Equal([]byte("foobar")))
})
It("has the proper length", func() {
b := bob.Seal(42, []byte("aad"), []byte("foobar"))
Expect(b).To(HaveLen(6 + 12))
})
It("fails with wrong aad", func() {
b := alice.Seal(42, []byte("aad"), []byte("foobar"))
_, err := bob.Open(42, []byte("aad2"), b)
Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred())
})
It("rejects wrong key and iv sizes", func() {
var err error
e := "AES-GCM: expected 16-byte keys and 4-byte IVs"
_, err = NewAEADAESGCM(keyBob[1:], keyAlice, ivBob, ivAlice)
Expect(err).To(MatchError(e))
_, err = NewAEADAESGCM(keyBob, keyAlice[1:], ivBob, ivAlice)
Expect(err).To(MatchError(e))
_, err = NewAEADAESGCM(keyBob, keyAlice, ivBob[1:], ivAlice)
Expect(err).To(MatchError(e))
_, err = NewAEADAESGCM(keyBob, keyAlice, ivBob, ivAlice[1:])
Expect(err).To(MatchError(e))
})
})

View File

@@ -39,11 +39,7 @@ func NewAEADChacha20Poly1305(otherKey []byte, myKey []byte, otherIV []byte, myIV
}
func (aead *aeadChacha20Poly1305) Open(packetNumber protocol.PacketNumber, associatedData []byte, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
plaintext, err := aead.decrypter.Open(nil, makeNonce(aead.otherIV, packetNumber), ciphertext, associatedData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return plaintext, nil
return aead.decrypter.Open(nil, makeNonce(aead.otherIV, packetNumber), ciphertext, associatedData)
}
func (aead *aeadChacha20Poly1305) Seal(packetNumber protocol.PacketNumber, associatedData []byte, plaintext []byte) []byte {

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ var _ = Describe("Chacha20poly1305", func() {
Expect(text).To(Equal([]byte("foobar")))
})
It("has the proper length", func() {
b := bob.Seal(42, []byte("aad"), []byte("foobar"))
Expect(b).To(HaveLen(6 + 12))
})
It("fails with wrong aad", func() {
b := alice.Seal(42, []byte("aad"), []byte("foobar"))
_, err := bob.Open(42, []byte("aad2"), b)

View File

@@ -11,8 +11,25 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
)
// DeriveKeysChacha20 derives the client and server keys and creates a matching chacha20poly1305 instance
// DeriveKeysChacha20 derives the client and server keys and creates a matching chacha20poly1305 AEAD instance
func DeriveKeysChacha20(version protocol.VersionNumber, forwardSecure bool, sharedSecret, nonces []byte, connID protocol.ConnectionID, chlo []byte, scfg []byte, cert []byte, divNonce []byte) (AEAD, error) {
otherKey, myKey, otherIV, myIV, err := deriveKeys(version, forwardSecure, sharedSecret, nonces, connID, chlo, scfg, cert, divNonce, 32)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return NewAEADChacha20Poly1305(otherKey, myKey, otherIV, myIV)
}
// DeriveKeysAESGCM derives the client and server keys and creates a matching AES-GCM AEAD instance
func DeriveKeysAESGCM(version protocol.VersionNumber, forwardSecure bool, sharedSecret, nonces []byte, connID protocol.ConnectionID, chlo []byte, scfg []byte, cert []byte, divNonce []byte) (AEAD, error) {
otherKey, myKey, otherIV, myIV, err := deriveKeys(version, forwardSecure, sharedSecret, nonces, connID, chlo, scfg, cert, divNonce, 16)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return NewAEADAESGCM(otherKey, myKey, otherIV, myIV)
}
func deriveKeys(version protocol.VersionNumber, forwardSecure bool, sharedSecret, nonces []byte, connID protocol.ConnectionID, chlo, scfg, cert, divNonce []byte, keyLen int) ([]byte, []byte, []byte, []byte, error) {
var info bytes.Buffer
if forwardSecure {
info.Write([]byte("QUIC forward secure key expansion\x00"))
@@ -26,31 +43,31 @@ func DeriveKeysChacha20(version protocol.VersionNumber, forwardSecure bool, shar
r := hkdf.New(sha256.New, sharedSecret, nonces, info.Bytes())
otherKey := make([]byte, 32)
myKey := make([]byte, 32)
otherKey := make([]byte, keyLen)
myKey := make([]byte, keyLen)
otherIV := make([]byte, 4)
myIV := make([]byte, 4)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, otherKey); err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, nil, nil, nil, err
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, myKey); err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, nil, nil, nil, err
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, otherIV); err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, nil, nil, nil, err
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, myIV); err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, nil, nil, nil, err
}
if !forwardSecure && version >= protocol.Version33 {
if err := diversify(myKey, myIV, divNonce); err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, nil, nil, nil, err
}
}
return NewAEADChacha20Poly1305(otherKey, myKey, otherIV, myIV)
return otherKey, myKey, otherIV, myIV, nil
}
func diversify(key, iv, divNonce []byte) error {

View File

@@ -8,79 +8,159 @@ import (
)
var _ = Describe("KeyDerivation", func() {
It("derives non-fs keys", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysChacha20(
protocol.Version32,
false,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
nil,
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadChacha20Poly1305)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf0, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0xa8}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x75, 0xd8, 0xa2, 0x8d}))
Context("chacha20poly1305", func() {
It("derives non-fs keys", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysChacha20(
protocol.Version32,
false,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
nil,
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadChacha20Poly1305)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf0, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0xa8}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x75, 0xd8, 0xa2, 0x8d}))
})
It("derives fs keys", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysChacha20(
protocol.Version32,
true,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
nil,
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadChacha20Poly1305)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf5, 0x73, 0x11, 0x79}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf7, 0x26, 0x4d, 0x2c}))
})
It("does not use diversification nonces in FS key derivation", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysChacha20(
protocol.Version33,
true,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
[]byte("divnonce"),
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadChacha20Poly1305)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf5, 0x73, 0x11, 0x79}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf7, 0x26, 0x4d, 0x2c}))
})
It("uses diversification nonces in initial key derivation", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysChacha20(
protocol.Version33,
false,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
[]byte("divnonce"),
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadChacha20Poly1305)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xc4, 0x12, 0x25, 0x64}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x75, 0xd8, 0xa2, 0x8d}))
})
})
It("derives fs keys", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysChacha20(
protocol.Version32,
true,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
nil,
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadChacha20Poly1305)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf5, 0x73, 0x11, 0x79}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf7, 0x26, 0x4d, 0x2c}))
})
Context("AES-GCM", func() {
It("derives non-fs keys", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysAESGCM(
protocol.Version32,
false,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
nil,
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadAESGCM)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x28, 0x71, 0x71, 0x16}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x64, 0xef, 0x3c, 0x9}))
})
It("does not use diversification nonces in FS key derivation", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysChacha20(
protocol.Version33,
true,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
[]byte("divnonce"),
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadChacha20Poly1305)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf5, 0x73, 0x11, 0x79}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf7, 0x26, 0x4d, 0x2c}))
})
It("derives fs keys", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysAESGCM(
protocol.Version32,
true,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
nil,
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadAESGCM)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x7, 0xad, 0xab, 0xb8}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf2, 0x7a, 0xcc, 0x42}))
})
It("uses diversification nonces in initial key derivation", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysChacha20(
protocol.Version33,
false,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
[]byte("divnonce"),
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadChacha20Poly1305)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xc4, 0x12, 0x25, 0x64}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x75, 0xd8, 0xa2, 0x8d}))
It("does not use diversification nonces in FS key derivation", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysAESGCM(
protocol.Version33,
true,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
[]byte("divnonce"),
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadAESGCM)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x7, 0xad, 0xab, 0xb8}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0xf2, 0x7a, 0xcc, 0x42}))
})
It("uses diversification nonces in initial key derivation", func() {
aead, err := DeriveKeysAESGCM(
protocol.Version33,
false,
[]byte("0123456789012345678901"),
[]byte("nonce"),
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
[]byte("chlo"),
[]byte("scfg"),
[]byte("cert"),
[]byte("divnonce"),
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
chacha := aead.(*aeadAESGCM)
// If the IVs match, the keys will match too, since the keys are read earlier
Expect(chacha.myIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x1c, 0xec, 0xac, 0x9b}))
Expect(chacha.otherIV).To(Equal([]byte{0x64, 0xef, 0x3c, 0x9}))
})
})
})